Colorado
The People of Colorado v. Bergen
883 P.2d 532
Court of Appeals of Colorado, 1994
FACTS: In 1989, Denver passed an ordinance banning the ownership of pitbulls. Shortly after the ordinance was passed, an investigative reporter from a local television station, Wendy Bergen, began working on a feature story concerning dogfighting in Colorado. Bergen and two cameramen attended and videotaped a dogfight and numerous fight training sessions. Upon learning that the attendance at a dogfight was illegal, the television station removed the story from the line-up. Bergen then fabricated a story that the dogfighting tape had been sent to her anonymously and the television station aired the dogfighting series including footage of the dogfight. Bergen was prosecuted for violating a statute prohibiting knowing presence at a dogfight held for profit or entertainment. The defendant was convicted by the trial court.
ISSUES: Did the trial court err in convicting Bergen on dogfighting charges?
HOLDING: No, the trial court did not err in convicting Bergen on dogfighting charges. Bergen argued that the newsgathering activities of videotaping and reporting a dogfight are protected by the First Amendment or alternatively, that the necessary mental state required for a conviction under the statute was lacking. The court disagreed, finding that the media did not have a right to engage in illegal activities for the purpose of newsgathering. They also found that the only required mental state for conviction was “knowing presence” at the event. The court further held that the statutory prohibition against a dogfight held for profit is constitutional.
Federal
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) v. Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey Circus
317 F.3d 334
United States District Court of the District of Columbia, 2003
FACTS: Thomas Rider, formerly employed by Ringling Bros. as an elephant handler, allegedly witnessed employees of Ringling Bros. routinely beating, chaining and otherwise mistreating the circus elephants. He witnessed the negative impact of such treatment in the elephants with which he had formed a “strong, personal attachment.” Rider left his job with Ringling Bros. due to the mistreatment and would like to visit the elephants and work with them again, but is unwilling to do so because of the “aesthetic and emotional injury” from seeing the animals unless they are placed in a different setting or are no longer mistreated. This case was brought by the ASPCA, et al., against Ringling Bros. due to their alleged routine beating, chaining and other mistreatment of the circus elephants. Plaintiffs argued that the mistreatment amounted to an unlawful taking of an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ case for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Did the District Court err in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III of the Constitution?
HOLDING: Yes, the District Court erred in finding that plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III of the Constitution. In order to establish standing under Article III, plaintiff must show 1) that he has suffered an injury in fact, which is 2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions, and 3) capable of judicial redress. The Court found that Rider alleged enough information to show 1) that the harm to his aesthetic interests in viewing the animals was an injury in fact, 2) that the alleged mistreatment of the elephants by Ringling Bros. employees was the source of said injury, and 3) that his injuries will likely be redressed if he is successful on the merits. Therefore, plaintiffs satisfy the standing requirement.
Born Free USA v. Norton
278 F.Supp.2d 5
United States District Court, District of Columbia, 2003
FACTS: Animal rights organizations and two individual plaintiffs brought action challenging the issuance of permits allowing for the importation of 11 African elephants from Swaziland. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the importation of the elephants until the Court reached a final determination on the merits of the case. The defendant zoos, however, argued that the process to import the elephants must begin immediately before the beginning of Swaziland’s rainy season, because the head of the reserve where the elephants are kept stated unequivocally that if he were unable to export the elephants, he would have to kill them.
ISSUES: Should the plaintiffs be granted a preliminary injunction to block the importation of the elephants?
HOLDING: No. The plaintiffs should not be granted a preliminary injunction. In order to prevail on a request for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must demonstrate 1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, 2) that they will suffer irreparable harm absent the relief requested, 3) that other parties will not be harmed if the requested relief is granted, and 4) that the public interest supports granting the requested relief. The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate all four criteria. They did not show a likelihood of success on the merits for numerous reasons including doubts as to their standing. They also failed to show that they would suffer irreparable harm if denied relief, because the court found that no detrimental effect to the species had been demonstrated because the imported elephants were to be used for breeding and proceeds from the importation were to be used for the benefit the foreign elephant habitat. The court also found that the federal government was within its authority to grant the permits. The preliminary injunction was denied.
204 F.3d 229
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 2000
FACTS: The American Legal Defense Fund, an animal welfare organization, and individual plaintiffs, brought suit against the United States Department of Agriculture challenging regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture (USDA) that purport to set “minimum requirements for a physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-being of primates” kept by exhibitors and researchers. Plaintiffs argued that the regulations did not set standards and that the USDA impermissibly delegated their legal responsibility. The District Court ruled for plaintiffs finding that the regulations did not set standards and the USDA impermissibly delegated their authority. The Court of Appeals ruled that none of the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the regulations. Upon rehearing, the Court of Appeals found that one individual plaintiff had standing to challenge the regulations and referred the merits of the appeal to the panel.
ISSUES: 1) Are the regulations issued by the USDA valid? 2) Does the Animal Legal Defense Fund have standing to raise a procedural injury claim?
HOLDING: 1) Yes, the regulations issued by the USDA are valid. The Court of Appeals found that the regulations, while at times minimal and potentially difficult to enforce, adequately set minimum standards for the care of primates by exhibitors and researchers. 2) No, the Animal Legal Defense Fund does not have standing to raise a procedural injury claim. Standing to raise a procedural injury claim requires that the procedural norm be one designated to protect some threatened concrete interest of the plaintiff. The Court found that ALDF had raised no such concrete interest in this case.
Federal
Haviland v. Butz
543 F.2d 169
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1976
FACTS: Haviland owned and operated a professional animal act featuring dogs and ponies. Haviland’s act traveled across state lines performing in front of paying audiences and occasionally appeared on commercial television. The Department of Agriculture gave Haviland notice that, as an “exhibitor”, he was in violation of the Animal Welfare Act of 1970 for failure to comply with its licensing provisions. Haviland obtained an exhibitor’s license, and then brought suit against the Secretary of Agriculture arguing that he was not subject to the provisions. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Secretary of Agriculture. Haviland appealed the decision.
ISSUES: Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to the Secretary of Agriculture?
HOLDING: No, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Secretary of Agriculture. Haviland argued that his act did not embrace animal performances and that the Secretary could not expand its coverage. The Court of Appeals disagreed. They held that the statutory listing of covered enterprises was not exhaustive and that the Secretary had the power “to promulgate such rules, regulations, and orders as he may deem necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the statutory scheme.” The Court further held that Haviland’s animal act, traveling from state to state and using facilities of interstate communication, was subject to regulation by Congress in the exercise of the commerce power. The Court also determined that the Act’s definition of exhibitor was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The articulated purpose of the Act is the assurance that designated species of animals used in the types of exhibitions covered will receive humane care and treatment. The definition of exhibitor found in the Animal Welfare Act directly implements the legislative objective.
Nevada
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, a/k/a PETA v. Bobby Berosini
111 Nev. 615
Supreme Court of Nevada, 1995
FACTS: Bobby Berosini, a world-renowned animal trainer, was secretly videotaped backstage before performances grabbing, slapping, punching, and shaking the orangutans he trained for his show at the Stardust Resort in Las Vegas. The tapes also showed Berosini striking the animals with a black rod ten to twelve inches long. Two animal rights organizations released the videotape and made statements regarding its contents. Berosini sued the animal rights organizations for libel and invasion of privacy. The jury returned a verdict for Berosini. Appellants appealed.
ISSUES: Did the distribution of the videotape and statements concerning its content amount to libel and invasion of privacy?
HOLDING: No, the distribution of the videotape and statements made by the animal rights organization did not amount to libel and invasion of privacy. The court held that the distribution of the video was not false or defamatory because it was an accurate portrayal of Berosini’s discipline methods and he believed that he was doing nothing wrong. They found that a statement made that Berosini “regularly abused” the animals was an evaluative opinion and not libelous. Berosini further argued that a statement PETA made accusing Berosini of beating the animals with steel rods was defamatory. The court found that it was not because the videotape, its contents not in dispute, clearly showed Berosini beating the animals with a black rod. Whether the rods in question were steel or wood was immaterial. The Court also held that the secret filming was not an intrusion on Berosini’s expected seclusion because his only expectation was freedom from interference while training the orangutans. The use of a hidden camera did not in fact interfere with the training and was not highly offensive to a reasonable person. Because Berosini was a public figure, he could not recover for appropriation.