Animal Cruelty/Abuse: Hoarding

Alaska

Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage

168 P.3d 890

Court of Appeals of Alaska, 2007

FACTS:  On October 6, 2004, the Anchorage Police Department and the Anchorage Animal Care and Control Center went to defendant Krystal Allen’s home in response to complaints of a foul odor.  Upon entering the home, animal control officers testified that it smelled of cat urine, the floor was covered in feces and debris, and there were approximately forty cats in the kitchen and even more in kennels downstairs.  In total, the officers concluded that there were between 180 to 200 cats, three dogs, thirteen birds and three chickens.  Most of the cats were malnourished and emaciated, with upper respiratory infections and ulcerated injuries on their eyes.  The animals also had no clean water and little food.  According to an animal control officer, they had documented similar conditions in Allen’s home from 1990 to 1999.  Allen was convicted in district court of two counts of cruelty to animals for maintaining animals in an inhumane manner.  She was sentenced to a 30-day term to serve and placed on probation for 10 years.  One of the conditions of the probation prohibits Allen from possessing any animal during this period.  Allen appeals.

  
ISSUES:  1) Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal since Allen’s sentence was only for 30 days; 2) whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a probationary condition that Allen not be allowed to possess animals while on probation.

HOLDINGS:  1) Yes, despite inconsistent previous decisions, the appellate court does in fact have jurisdiction to review this type of a claim.  According to Alaskan statute, the appellate court has jurisdiction over all sentence appeals from a district court except for those that challenge as excessive a term of imprisonment of 120 days or less.  2) No, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing as a term of Allen’s probation that she not be allowed to possess animals for the duration.  Given the fact that the court determined that Allen had a history of cruelty to animals and the animals in her care suffered horribly, prohibiting Allen from possessing animals during the term of her probation was reasonably related to her rehabilitation and to protecting the public. 

California

People v. Youngblood

109 Cal.Rptr.2d 776

Court of Appeals, Third District, California, 2001

FACTS:  Defendant Suzanna Youngblood had 92 cats that she kept in a trailer with less than one square foot for each cat.  When animal control received a complaint that an excessive number of cats were being kept in poor health and living conditions in a small trailer, they sent an officer over to investigate.  Upon arrival at the property, the officer smelled a strong odor of ammonia, which he associated with animal urine.  Looking through the windows of the trailer, he saw numerous cats, fecal matter, and urine.  Many of the cats appeared to be unhealthy, sneezing and with eye discharge.  After obtaining a search warrant, the officer towed the trailer to a building where it could be opened without losing control of the cats.  According to veterinarian’s examination, many of the cats exhibited symptoms of inadequate care over a long period of time, including dehydration, chronic malnourishment, anorexia, urine scald, and severe infection.  At trial Youngblood testified, saying that she knew she had too many cats but was trying to save their lives.  The trial court convicted Youngblood of felony animal cruelty for cruelty to all 92 of the cats.  Youngblood appeals.

   
ISSUES:  1) Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury concerning the elements of animal cruelty by improperly applying the word “and” in the animal cruelty statute, and 2) whether the defense of necessity was available to Youngblood.

HOLDINGS:  1) No, the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the animal cruelty statute.  For a felony animal cruelty conviction only one of the elements listed in the animal cruelty statute need be met, not both.  Therefore, the jury could find Youngblood guilty of animal cruelty for either depriving the cats of necessary sustenance, drink, or shelter, or subjecting the cats to needless suffering.  2) No, the defense of necessity was not available to Youngblood.  Her claim that it was necessary to save the cats from euthanasia at animal control goes against public policy.

Florida

Brinkley v. County of Flagler

769 So.2d 468

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, 2000

FACTS:  A sheriff deputy and animal cruelty investigator met at defendants Linda and Henry Brinkley’s farm after receiving a citizen complaint that a large number of animals were being kept in unhealthy conditions there.  As the officer and investigator stood by the front gate, they were overwhelmed by the smell of animal waste.  The front yard and porch were covered in feces.  On the porch there was also the decaying carcass of a dog on top of a stack of small pet carriers.  Fluid from the dog was dripping on a live poodle in one of the carriers.  The live animals in the carriers did not have food or water and could not straighten their legs.  The inside of the house and the trailers used to house animals were in a similar state, covered in feces, decaying carcasses and garbage, and overrun by cockroaches and rats.  The County seized approximately 358 dogs and one bird.  It took more than twenty-five veterinarians to address the dogs’ health problems.  At trial, the court found that the Brinkleys were unfit and unable to adequately provide for the animals, and ordered that the animals be turned over to the local humane society for placement and disposition.  Linda Brinkley appeals.

ISSUES:  1) Whether the officer and investigator’s initial warrantless inspection of the Brinkley’s farm constitutes an illegal search and seizure; 2) whether the Brinkleys received adequate due process when the statute in question does not provide for a preliminary hearing prior to seizure of property; 3) whether the statute was unconstitutional; 4) whether it was error to transfer the case from county to circuit court.

HOLDINGS:  1) No, the warrantless inspection of the Brinkley’s farm carried out by the sheriff deputy and animal cruelty investigator did not constitute an illegal search and seizure.  It was justified under the emergency exception to the warrant requirement.  2) Yes, Brinkley did receive adequate due process.  A preliminary hearing was not necessary because the post-seizure hearing provided adequately protected her due process rights.  3)  No, the statute providing for an injunction was not unconstitutional because the statute did not indefinitely prohibit Brinkley from possessing animals.  Legislative protection of animals from harassment and ill-treatment is a valid exercise of police power.  In addition, the statute cannot be considered unconstitutional for failing to specify which party has the burden of proof because it does state at which point the burden shifts to either party.  4)  No, it was not error to transfer the case from county to circuit court because the circuit court had jurisdiction over the issue of costs for care of the animals.   

Louisiana

State v. Walder

952 So.2d 21

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, 2006

FACTS:  After receiving a complaint of animal hoarding, the sheriff’s office seized 119 dogs, 44 horses and seven turtles from defendant Janis Walder’s house.  The house was described as being in “deplorable” condition, and most of the animals were in very poor health.  Walder pled guilty, and was sentenced.  Following a restitution hearing, the trial court ordered Walder to pay approximately $46,679.00 in restitution.  Walder moved for reconsideration of the restitution order, which the trial court denied.  Walder appeals.

 
ISSUES:  1) Whether a single sentence for all 123 counts of animal cruelty was legal; 2) whether the trial court was authorized to order Walder to pay restitution as a condition of probation; 3) whether Walder was liable for the costs of boarding and veterinary care of the animals after she executed transfer of ownership; 4) whether Walder could use the proceeds from the sale of the horses as credit against restitution.

HOLDINGS:  1) No, a single sentence for 123 counts of animal cruelty was not legal.  Each of Walder’s convictions of 123 counts of aggravated cruelty to animals requires imposition of a separate sentence. 2) Yes, the trial court was authorized to order Walder to pay restitution as a condition of probation.  However, the restitution could only include the reasonable expenses for boarding and veterinary care of the animals prior to their disposition.  3) No, Walder was not liable in restitution for the costs of boarding and veterinary care of the animals after ownership had been transferred to the parish.  4) No, Walder could not use the proceeds from the sale of the horses as credit against the restitution she owed.  Walder had already relinquished ownership of the horses by the date of sale; therefore she is not entitled to benefit from the proceeds of the sale.  As a result of these holdings, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded.

North Carolina

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Woodley

640 S.E.2d 777

Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2007

FACTS:  Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) filed a complaint against defendants Barbara and Robert Woodley, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions.  ALDF claimed that the Woodleys had abused and neglected over 300 dogs as well as some birds in their possession.  The lower court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Woodleys from any further violation of the Protection of Animals statute.  The injunction required the Woodleys to properly maintain the parts of their property in which the animals were kept, and granted ALDF access to the property to take care of the animals.  Following trial the judge entered a permanent injunction and temporary custody order.  The Woodleys, who had also been charged and convicted criminally, filed notice of appeal. 

 
ISSUES:  1) Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case because ALDF’s complaint was not verified; 2) whether the Protection of Animals statute was unconstitutional because it grants standing to persons who have suffered no injury.

HOLDINGS:  1) Yes, verification of complaint was not a requirement for issuance of permanent injunction.  In addition, the Woodleys only gave notice of appeal for the permanent injunction, not for the preliminary injunction.  Therefore, the issue of whether it was error for the trial court to issue the preliminary injunction is not before the Court.  2) No, the Protection of Animals statute was not unconstitutional.  The legislature granted standing to “any person,” with the intention of enabling the broadest category of people or organizations to contest cruelty to animals.

Oregon

Cat Champion Corp. v. Primrose

149 P.3d 1276

Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2006

FACTS:  The sheriff’s department received a report that respondent Jean Marie Primrose was neglecting her cats.  When the deputies arrived at Primrose’s trailer, they found malnourished, filthy cats with missing patches of fur.  The deputies seized eleven cats and took them to Cat Champion, a nonprofit organization dedicated to the rescue and rehabilitation of cats.  Primrose was charged with criminal animal neglect in the second degree.  The trial court dismissed the charges after a psychological evaluation revealed Primrose’s inability to aid in her own defense due to cognitive impairment.  However, since Primrose was no longer being charged with a crime, Cat Champion lacked statutory authority to permanently place the cats in adoptive homes.  Cat Champion filed a petition seeking a limited protective order regarding Primrose’s cats, and appointment as Primrose’s fiduciary for the limited purpose of permanently placing the cats in adoptive homes.  The circuit court refused to issue the order, holding that it was not authorized to permanently take away Primrose’s cats.  Cat Champion appeals.

 
ISSUE:  Whether the trial court erred in refusing to issue a protective order and to appoint Cat Champion as fiduciary. 

HOLDING:  Yes, the trial court did err in refusing to issue Cat Champion a limited protective order and appoint the organization as fiduciary for the purpose of implementing the protective order.  The two required elements for appointment of a conservator have been met: Primrose is financially incapable and has property that requires management or protection.  Therefore, grounds exist for the appointment of Cat Champion as a fiduciary. 

Utah

State v. McDonald

110 P.3d 149

Court of Appeals of Utah, 2005

FACTS:  Defendant Sydney McDonald was convicted of multiple counts of animal cruelty after authorities discovered 58 diseased cats and one dead cat in her possession.  McDonald purchased a trailer in January 2001 with the alleged intention of creating a “sanctuary” for stray cats.  She instructed the landowner to feed, water and provide litter to the cats, but not to open any windows in the trailer or to go near the cats.  Furthermore, McDonald told the landowner that she would provide the cats with veterinary care, but failed to do so.  When authorities discovered the cats, they were all ill as a result of close confinement in the trailer with insufficient ventilation.  Many of the cats had to be euthanized due to illness or injury.  At trial the court sentenced McDonald to ninety days of jail time for each count, and then suspended all but two days of the sentence.  The court also placed McDonald on two years of formal probation and twelve and one-half years of informal probation.  The probation terms prohibited McDonald from possessing any animals during this time.  McDonald appeals.

 
ISSUES:  1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of an animal services officer regarding a previous incident where McDonald was in possession of 53 cats; 2) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the cruelty to animals convictions; 3) whether the trial court erred in sentencing McDonald to fourteen and one-half years of suspended incarceration and probation.

 
HOLDINGS:  1) No, the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony relating to a previous incident in which McDonald was found to be in possession of 53 cats.  This evidence was relevant and not prejudicial.  2) Yes, there was sufficient evidence to support McDonald’s convictions for cruelty to animals.  The evidence suggests that McDonald knew it was unhealthy to house large numbers of cats in such close quarters, but did so anyway without providing necessary care or veterinary treatment.  This evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that McDonald failed to provide necessary care or shelter for the cats.  3) Yes, the trial court did err in sentencing McDonald to an over fourteen-year probationary term for misdemeanor offenses.  Probation for a class C misdemeanor is limited to twelve months, thus the trial court’s sentence exceeded its statutory authority.