Agriculture: Standard Practices
California
Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Department of Food & Agriculture
74 Cal.Rptr.2d 75
Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California, 1998
FACTS: Farm Sanctuary, Inc. is a nonprofit organization that promotes the humane treatment of farm animals. In 1991 the California Legislature amended the Humane Slaughter Law (HSL) to include poultry, and authorized the Department of Food and Agriculture to issue regulations concerning the slaughter of poultry. The regulations authorize the chief of the department’s meat and poultry inspection branch to approve other methods of ritualistic slaughter. In May 1996, Farm Sanctuary filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the “ritualistic slaughter” exemption permitted the inhumane slaughter of poultry, and therefore was in conflict with the HSL. The trial court found the regulation to be consistent with the HSL and entered judgment for the department. Farm Sanctuary appeals.
ISSUES: Whether the department’s regulation exempting certain forms of ritualistic slaughter is invalid because it is contrary to the HSL.
HOLDING: No, the regulation is not invalid or contrary to the HSL. The ritualistic slaughter regulation does not authorize the approval of inhumane methods of killing poultry. The regulation requires that exemptions for other methods of ritualistic slaughter be humane, and therefore is consistent with the HSL.
Federal (U.S.)
Jones v. Butz
374 F.Supp. 1284
United States District Court, S.D. New York, 1974
FACTS: Plaintiffs are six individuals and three organizations who have in common a professed commitment to the humane treatment of animals and the separation of church and state. Plaintiffs bring suit against defendants the Secretary of Agriculture, the Acting Administrator of Consumer and Market Services of the Department of Agriculture, and a rabbi, challenging provisions of the Humane Slaughter Act relating to ritual slaughter under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and three-judge panel held that plaintiffs had standing to bring this action. Intervention has also been permitted to seven individuals and five organizations, representing Jews in the United States. This case is in the district court for the southern district of New York.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Humane Slaughter Act relating to ritual slaughter, which fail to require that the animal be rendered insensible to pain before the handling process, are offensive to and inconsistent with the humane purposes of the Act and have a special religious purpose in contravention of the First Amendment.
HOLDING: The court held that there is no violation of the Establishment Clause because there is no excessive governmental entanglement. In addition, by making it possible for those who wish to eat ritually acceptable meat to slaughter the animal in accordance with the tenets of their faith, Congress neither established the tenets of that faith nor interfered with the exercise of any other.
Iowa
State ex rel. Miller v. DeCoster
596 N.W.2d 898
Supreme Court of Iowa, 1999
FACTS: Appellant Austin DeCoster owned more than thirty hog confinement facilities in Iowa, only three of which are implicated here. DeCoster is responsible for management and disposal of manure. In April 1995 DeCoster’s employee, Robert Polzin, was irrigating the land through a series of “pulls.” During the second “pull” that evening, Polzin noticed water and manure pooling in low spots. Irrigation continued until the morning, at which point a local man noticed that the tile outlets were running a dirty darkish color and there was a strong odor of manure. The outlets discharge into a stream that joins the Iowa River. A field agent from the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) arrived later that day to inspect the field. The agent concluded that the source of the discharge in the tiles was a result of DeCoster farms’ spray irrigation penetrating three feet of soil to reach the tile line. The district court convicted DeCoster of disposal of animal waste in violation of water pollution and animal control requirements. DeCoster appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that polluted discharge from the tile outlets flowed from DeCoster’s spray irrigation; 2) whether DeCoster was strictly liable for violating the statute prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into state waters; 3) whether the spray irrigation violated the regulation requiring that manure removed from an animal feeding operation be land-applied in a manner that would not cause pollution; 4) whether the permits that DeCoster obtained for his operations from the DNR immunized him from liability for environmental violations.
HOLDINGS: 1) Yes, there is substantial evidence to support the finding that polluted discharge found in the tile outlets flowed from DeCoster’s spray irrigation. The record establishes, to a near certainty, that DeCoster’s spray irrigation caused the pollution. 2) Yes, DeCoster was strictly liable for violating the statute prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into state waters. 3) Yes, the spray irrigation violated the regulation requiring that manure removed from an animal feeding operation be land-applied in a manner that would not cause pollution. The evidence of pollution caused by DeCoster’s spray irrigation establishes such a violation. 4) No, the permits that DeCoster obtained from the DNR did not immunize him from liability for environmental violations. Issuance of a permit for a hog operation by the DNR will not accord a hog confinement operator a license to otherwise violate statutes imposing environmental restrictions on hog operators.
Pennsylvania
Com. v. Barnes
629 A.2d 123
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1993
FACTS: In May 1991, David Philipe, an environmental inspector with the Erie County Health Department, went to appellants David and Alice Barnes’ horse farm. Philipe went to investigate a complaint concerning odors coming from the farm. When he arrived at the farm, no one was home. Philipe did notice a strong odor of dead or rotting animals though, and after walking around the farm, he saw the carcasses of dead animals, including two horses. Looking into the barns, he saw several horses that appeared to be uncared for and undernourished. Philipe notified David Barnes of his violation of health Department regulations, and also informed Merle Wolfgang, chief cruelty officer of the Erie Humane Society, of his findings. Wolfgang then went to the Barnes’ farm the next day and found conditions to be as Philipe described. When Wolfgang returned a few days later, intending to obtain the Barnes’ permission to search their farm, they informed her that they had given the horses away. As she was leaving the farm though, Wolfgang saw several sick and malnourished looking horses in a nearby field. She learned that the Barnes were renting the field. Wolfgang then obtained a search warrant, and removed seven horses from the field. A farrier and veterinarian examined the horses and concluded that they were suffering from numerous, severe, chronic health problems. David and Alice Barnes were found guilty of ten counts of cruelty to animals. They appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, where they were convicted of seven counts of cruelty to animals. Their post-verdict motions were denied and they appealed.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the statutory grant of police powers to the Humane Society was an improper delegation of governmental authority; 2) whether the statutory provision under which the Barnes were convicted is unconstitutionally vague and violative of due process; 3) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the Barnes’ convictions.
HOLDINGS: 1) No, the statutory grant of police powers to the Humane Society was not an improper delegation of governmental authority. The actions of the Humane Society agents were regulated and constrained; the agents could be considered police officers because they had been given the power to arrest when acting within the scope of their employment; their searches were reasonable; the agents were paid employees and so they are not shielded from liability by the “good Samaritan” statute. 2) No, the statutory provision under which the Barnes were convicted is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate due process. There is a statutory exception for activity which is “undertaken in normal agricultural operations,” however the Barnes’ utter neglect of the horses does not fall within the exception. 3) Since the Barnes’ neglect of their horses does not fall within the “normal agricultural operations” exception, their challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is without merit.