Entertainment: Animal Fighting
Alabama
Jones v. State
473 So.2d 1197
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, 1985
FACTS: Statute 3-1-29, which makes it a felony for any person to own, possess, keep or train any dog with the intent that the dog shall be engaged in dog fighting, became effective on May, 4, 1982. Two days later animal cruelty investigator Carter visited appellant Jones under the pretext of seeking to purchase a “fighting dog.” Carter testified that while he was at Jones’ house on May 6, he observed five pit bulldogs individually chained in Jones’ backyard. While Carter was there, Jones set up a fight between two of the dogs, letting them fight for 30 or 40 seconds before stopping them. The dogs were injured in the fight in Carter’s presence. Based on his observations from May 6, Carter obtained a search warrant and returned to Jones’ house where he confiscated five pit bulldogs, three rabbits, and a training wheel. The trial court convicted Jones of unlawfully owning, possessing, keeping or training a dog or dogs with the intent that the dogs engage in fighting. Jones appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether 3-1-29 is unconstitutionally vague; 2) whether the statute is unconstitutional as being applied ex post facto to Jones; 3) whether the veterinarian’s and director of the humane society’s testimony were of no probative value and highly prejudicial to Jones; 4) whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence obtained by a police officer who, with a valid search warrant, searched Jones’ home without him being present.
HOLDING: 1) No, 3-1-29 is not void for vagueness and therefore unconstitutional. 2) No, the statute is not unconstitutional as applied ex post facto to Jones because Carter’s testimony was sufficient to establish that Jones caused the dogs to fight and be injured on May 6. The jury had enough evidence to convict Jones after the effective date of 3-1-29. 3) No, the veterinarian and humane society director’s testimonies were not of no probative value and were not highly prejudicial to Jones. The evidence presented by the veterinarian and the director as to the poor conditions of the dogs and the vicious propensities they exhibited while staying at the humane society were relevant to the issue of Jones’ intent to fight the dogs. 4) No, the trial court did not err in allowing the police officer’s evidence. The constitution does not require that the occupant of a home be present before it can be searched under a valid search warrant.
Arkansas
Ash v. State
718 S.W.2d 930
Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1986
FACTS: On the night of May 10, 1985 police entered a building behind the residence of Darryl and Winifred Hook. A dog fight between two pit bull terriers was taking place. There were fifteen people present, including the Hooks’ 12 year old son who was video-taping the dog fight. The police arrested everyone except the son, and took possession of the videotape and a copy of the rules for dog fighting. Everyone was charged with witnessing a dog fight or being present at a dog fight. When Winifred Hook arrived home, she was also arrested. She was charged with promoting or engaging in dog fighting or possessing a dog for that purpose. The jury found all of the appellants guilty. They appeal.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the copy of the rules was admissible evidence because the State did not show that the appellants were aware of its existence, and 2) whether the State produced substantial evidence to show that Winifred Hook was guilty of having “promoted” dog fighting, despite the fact that she did not engage in it the night of May 10, 1985.
HOLDING: Yes and yes. 1) The copy of the rules was admissible because the rules were relevant to the case, as they explained the purpose of the pit and details shown on the videotape. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the people present at the dog fight. 2) The State did produce substantial evidence to establish that Winifred Hook was guilty of promoting dog fighting despite her absence on the night in question. The evidence presented to the jury included Hook’s knowledge of a permanent structure in her yard to house pit bull dogs other than her own, her awareness that her husband had fought dogs, the fact that she saw nothing wrong with dog fighting, the fact that she had helped take care of the pit bull dogs on her premises, as well as her knowledge that people came to the house and brought pit bulls with them. The Supreme Court held that from this evidence the jury could reasonably conclude that Winifred Hook promoted dog fighting.
California
People v. Berry
1 Cal.App.4th 778
Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California, 1991
FACTS: Two year old James Soto lived next door to defendant Michael Berry. Berry was interested and involved in dog fighting, and owned three pit bulldogs. Berry informed James’ uncle that one of the dogs, Willy, was “vicious and dangerous,” and that if he got loose he could “do a job” on certain people. Berry also kept a wedge which he used to pry Willy’s mouth open. Berry kept Willy in a corridor between his house and a shed on a six-foot chain. However, there was unimpeded access to the corridor from the lawn. Berry told James’ mother that his dogs would not hurt her children. On June 13, 1987 James’ mother put him in a fenced patio and went inside to take care of one of her other children. James escaped and wandered into Berry’s yard where he was mauled to death by Willy. The trial court convicted Berry of involuntary manslaughter, keeping a mischievous animal, and keeping a fighting dog. Berry appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a minor under the age of five years is not required to take precautions; 2) whether the trial court erred in its definition of mischievous; 3) whether the dog-bite statute defined Berry’s duty toward James.
HOLDING: 1) No, the trial court’s instruction that a minor under the age of five years is not required to take precautions was essentially correct. Any error in failing to require a finding concerning the victim’s age was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2) Yes, the trial court’s definition of mischievous was overbroad. However, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury relied on the erroneous portion of the definition, i.e. found Berry guilty based on a “mischievous propensity” that would not naturally result in injury. As a result, the erroneous definition was not prejudicial error under any standard of review. 3) No, the civil dog-bite statute did not define Berry’s duty toward James. There is nothing in the statute to suggest it creates a defense in a criminal action.
Georgia
Barton v. State
322 S.E.2d 54
Supreme Court of Georgia, 1984
FACTS: In the early morning of October 8, 1983, law enforcement officers executed a raid on the Hargrove farm. As the officers approached the farm, there was a crowd of people standing around a large pit. Most of the people fled when they noticed the officers. The officers then found two bloodied and wounded pit bulldogs in the pit, other pit bulldogs tied up, as well as the equipment used in organized dogfighting and the decaying carcasses of animals wired to devices used to train dogs for dogfighting. As a result, appellants Townsend, Chafin, Barton and Greene were convicted of dogfighting and gambling. They appeal.
ISSUES: Whether the State had sufficient evidence linking each of the appellants to the crimes of dogfighting and gambling.
HOLDING: The State did have sufficient evidence to convict Greene, but not for Townsend, Chafin and Barton. For Greene, the court concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence. However, for Townsend, Chafin and Barton, the court found that there was no evidence linking these defendants to the area in which the dogfighting and gambling were taking place as they were apprehended elsewhere and there was no eyewitness evidence connecting them to the dogfighting pit. The court held that the evidence in the record was insufficient to support the convictions of Townsend, Chafin and Barton.
Georgia
Hargrove et al. v. State
321 S.E.2d 104
Supreme Court of Georgia, 1984
FACTS: Law enforcement officers raided a dogfight being held on appellant Hargrove’s property. When the officers arrived on the scene, they saw appellant Swetman, covered in blood, standing inside a square pit with two bloodied and wounded dogs. The officers also overheard someone say, “I’ll take five on that.” The southeastern regional director of the Humane Society also accompanied the officers on the raid. He identified the uses of certain dogfighting paraphernalia found on Hargrove’s property, including weighing scales, washtubs, “breaking sticks,” treadmills and “catmills.” The officers apprehended appellant Hargrove as he was leaving the pit area and appellant Kelly was found hiding in the bushes. The trial court convicted all of the appellants for dogfighting and gambling. Hargrove and Swetman were also convicted of commercial gambling. Hargrove, Swetman and Kelly appeal.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the dogfighting statute is unconstitutionally vague and violative of due process; 2) whether the penalty for violating the dogfighting statute amounts to cruel and unusual punishment; 3) whether there is sufficient evidence to support appellants’ convictions; 4) whether dogfighting is, as a matter of law or as a matter of fact, a lesser included offense of commercial gambling.
HOLDING: 1) No, the dogfighting statute is not unconstitutionally vague and does not violate equal protection. The statute is sufficiently definite to inform those of common intelligence that knowing participation in a dogfight is prohibited. The statute is not invalid on equal protection grounds because there is a compelling state interest in discouraging organized dogfights, which justifies the felony punishment. 2) No, the court holds as a matter of law that the fine and optional imprisonment do not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 3) Yes, there is sufficient evidence to support appellants’ convictions. The evidence of gambling devices and the purpose of dogfighting is sufficient to convict. 4) No, dogfighting is not as a matter of law or a matter of fact a lesser included offense of commercial gambling.
Georgia
Moody v. State
320 S.E.2d 545
Supreme Court of Georgia, 1984
FACTS: Fifty-nine defendants were indicted for violating the dog fighting statute. The trial court overruled a motion to quash and strike the indictment on the grounds that the law is unconstitutional. The court granted an interlocutory appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the dog fighting statute is overbroad in that it fails to delineate conduct that is permissible, and has a coercive effect.
HOLDING: No, the dog fighting statute is not overbroad for failing to delineate permissible conduct. The statute required knowing and consensual involvement in dog fighting, which therefore means it required intent. In addition, the statute prohibited participation on any level because without such participation dog fighting’s purpose of profit or gambling would not exist. As a result, the court held that the statute did not infringe on constitutionally protected conduct.
Hawaii
State v. Kaneakua
597 P.2d 590
Supreme Court of Hawaii, 1979
FACTS: This case represents forty-seven prosecutions for violations of part of Hawaii’s cruelty to animals statute made in 1974 and 1975. A motion to dismiss these prosecutions was filed. Defendants stipulated that they had knowingly participated in a cockfight at the time and place charged. The district court granted the motion, holding that the statute was unconstitutional. The State of Hawaii appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the cruelty to animals statute was so vague or overbroad as to deny defendants due process.
HOLDING: The cruelty to animals statute was constitutional. The statute was not vague; it was sufficiently definite to satisfy due process as regards the charge of cockfighting. In addition, the statute was not overbroad as applied to defendants; defendants participation in cockfighting was not protected conduct. Finally, defendants did not have standing to challenge the statute for vagueness or overbreadth as applied to hypothetical situations.
Louisiana
Claddie Savage v. Prator
866 So.2d 523
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit, 2004
FACTS: Plaintiffs Claddie Savage of Piney Woods Game Club, and Ark-La-Tex Game Club, Inc. filed this suit against the Caddo Parish Commission and the Caddo Parish Sheriff's Office after being informed by the sheriff that an existing parish ordinance against cockfighting would be enforced. Cockfighting tournaments had been held at the Piney Woods Game Club since 1991; Savage purchased the Piney Woods Game Club in 2003. Ark-La-Tex Game Club has also been conducting cockfighting tournaments since 1997. Plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, which the trial court granted after finding that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing that the parish had usurped the police power reserved to the state. Plaintiffs also requested declaratory judgment and a permanent injunction, however these were deferred until trial on the merits. The Caddo Parish Commission appealed.
ISSUES: Whether the parish ordinance that includes fowl in the definition of “animals” abridges the police power of the State of Louisiana.
HOLDING: The trial court correctly found that the parish ordinance implicated in this case abridges the police power of the State of Louisiana. The parish ordinance makes illegal what the state has deemed to be legal, and is therefore in conflict with an act of the state legislature.
Louisiana
State v. Caillet
518 So.2d 1062
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit, 1987
FACTS: Twenty-six people were charged with dog fighting in violation of a Louisiana statute for paying a fee to be spectators at a dog fight. The trial court denied their motion to quash. Eleven of the defendants then applied for supervisory writs, claiming that the indictment filed against them should be quashed because it fails to charge a punishable offense.
ISSUE: Whether the Louisiana statute proscribes paying a fee to be a spectator at a dog fight.
HOLDING: No, the Louisiana statue does not proscribe paying a fee to be a spectator at a dog fight. Therefore, the motion to quash is granted.
Mississippi
32 Pit Bulldogs and Other Property v. County of Prentiss
808 So.2d 971
Supreme Court of Mississippi, 2002
FACTS: Watkins was arrested and charged with the crime of dog fighting. As a result of the arrest, 32 of Watkins’ pit bulldogs were seized. While the criminal trial was pending, the Circuit Court, Prentiss County, ordered the humane euthanization of 18 of the 32 seized dogs. Watkins appealed.
ISSUES: Whether the Circuit Court erred in determining that the vicious and aggressive nature of the pit bulldogs was a “physical condition” which permitted euthanization.
HOLDING: No, the Circuit Court did not err in considering the vicious and aggressive nature of the pit bulldogs as a “physical condition” permitting euthanization. The Supreme Court held that allegations that the dogs had been trained to fight, could not be rehabilitated as pets, and posed serious threat to other animals and people related to the "physical condition" of the dogs and was a statutory basis for humane euthanization. This broader interpretation of the statute is in keeping with the legislative intent in enacting the criminal dogfight statute.
Oklahoma
Maloney v. State
532 P.2d 78
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, 1975
FACTS: On September 24, 1972, defendant Lee Maloney maliciously placed a dog in a pit with another dog and encourage the dogs to fight, maim, or kill one another. The dogs did fight and injure one another. The trial court convicted Maloney for the offense of cruelty to animals. Maloney appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the anti-cruelty statute under which defendant had been convicted was constitutional as applied to the case.
HOLDING: Yes, the anti-cruelty statute was constitutional as applied to the case. However, the appellate court reversed and remanded the case because the defendant had been improperly convicted under the anti-cruelty statute instead of under the dogfighting statute.
Oregon
Oregon Game Fowl Breeders Ass’n v. Smith
516 P.2d 499
Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1973
FACTS: Plaintiffs, Oregon Game Fowl Breeders Association, raise fowl in order to sell the birds to people who then engage them in combat. However, for the purpose of maintaining the purity of their breeding stock, plaintiffs occasionally engage the birds in combat themselves to see if they have a fighting instinct. The trial court rendered a declaratory judgment, which stated that game cock fighting is prohibited under ORS 167.850 and ORS 167.860; ORS 167.860 is not unconstitutional because of the exceptions provided; and ORS 167.850 and ORS 167.860 are unconstitutional in that they provide different penalties for the same conduct. The trial court also issued an injunction against enforcement of these statutes against plaintiffs by defendants, the district attorney and the Attorney General for Oregon. Defendants appeal the portion of the declaratory judgment that declares ORS 167.850 and ORS 167.860 unconstitutional.
ISSUES: 1) Whether ORS 167.850 and ORS 167.860 are unconstitutional because they provide different penalties for the same conduct; 2) whether ORS 167.860 is unconstitutional because of the exception; 3) whether cockfighting is a practice of good livestock husbandry and so is exempt from the provisions of ORS 167.860; 4) whether cockfighting is prohibited by either ORS 167.850 or ORS 167.860.
HOLDING: 1) No, ORS 167.850 and ORS 167.860 are constitutional because they do not provide different penalties for the same offense; rather they differentiate penalties on the basis of the culpable mental state of the actor. Also, in some respects the acts prohibited are different. 2) No, the exception has a rational basis and is not grounds for declaring ORS 167.860 unconstitutional. 3) No, the practice of breeding birds suitable for cockfighting does not qualify as good livestock animal husbandry. 4) Yes, cockfighting is prohibited by both ORS 167.850 and ORS 167.860. The statutes specifically include birds as animals and are written in terms that prohibit cruel mistreatment. There is no basis for concluding that the legislature did not intend to include cockfighting.
Texas
Rogers v. State
760 S.W.2d 669
Court of Appeals of Texas, 1988
FACTS: On the morning of February 8, 1986, Deputy Sheriff Wisdom received information from an unnamed informant that a dog fight was going to take place that day on property owned by Jeff and Janice Rogers. At 8 a.m. Wisdom drove by the Rogers’ property but saw nothing unusual taking place. A few hours later, Wisdom returned to the Rogers’ property and saw four to six pickups parked next to the barn where only one had been earlier. Wisdom returned to the sheriff’s office and informed the sheriff, who accompanied Wisdom and two other deputies to the Rogers’ property to investigate the possibility of a dog fight. When the officers arrived at the Rogers’ property, they saw fifteen to twenty vehicles parked at the barn. As the officers got out of the car, Janice Rogers opened the door of her truck and honked the horn. The officers then saw twenty to thirty people flee from an area near the barn, and saw a truck with dog cages drive away. Wisdom arrested Rogers. A search of the area revealed a dog fighting pit with blood stains on the wood, pit bulldogs, cleaning supplies for the dogs, and two sticks used to separate fighting dogs. The trial court convicted Rogers for dog fighting. Rogers appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing the evidence the officers obtained in the warrantless search of Rogers’ property; 2) whether the dog-fighting law is unconstitutionally vague; 3) whether the dog-fighting law is in conflict with a section (6.01) that requires a voluntary act or omission as a condition of criminal responsibility.
HOLDING: 1) No, the Fourth Amendment protection requiring a search warrant does not extend to undeveloped areas outside of a person’s home. Here no warrant was required to search the dog pit on the Rogers’ open field. 2) No, the dog-fighting law is not unconstitutionally vague because the word “permit” assumes the authority to consent. 3) No, the dog-fighting law is not in conflict with Section 6.01 because the dog-fighting law itself proscribes the omission to act.
Texas
Mejia v. State
618 S.W.2d 88
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourteenth District, 1984
FACTS: Appellants Jose Jesus Mejia and Jose Refugio Mejia were charged with intentionally and knowingly causing game roosters to fight. Appellants filed applications for writ of habeas corpus. The trial court issued each writ and then held a hearing on both applications. Following the hearing, the court denied pre-conviction relief and refused to discharge the appellants from the prosecution. Appellants appeal from the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the statute prohibiting one animal from fighting another is applicable to game roosters; 2) whether the statute prohibiting one animal from fighting another is vague or violative of due process; 3) whether the testimony of defendants’ expert witness on cockfighting was irrelevant.
HOLDING: 1) Yes, the statute prohibiting one animal from fighting another does apply to game roosters. Therefore, the statute prohibits causing game roosters to fight. 2) No, the statute prohibiting one animal from fighting another is neither vague nor violative of due process. The wording of the statute clearly sets out prohibited activities. 3) Yes, the testimony of the defendants’ expert witness on cockfighting was irrelevant as regards the constitutionality of the statute. However, the expert witness’s research on the history and illegality of cockfighting was not material to a determination of the case at bar.