Companion Animals: Housing
Alabama
Scott v. Donkel
671 So.2d 741
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 1995
FACTS: Danielle Scott, a minor, was bitten by a dog that was kept on property owned by William J. Donkel III and leased to William Beasley. The dog belonged to Beasley’s roommate and was typically kept in a fenced in area. At the time of the attack the dog was roaming free on the street in front of Donkel’s property. Scott is suing Donkel for negligence alleging that Donkel, as the landlord, had the right to inspect the premises and terminate Beasley’s lease agreement, and that Donkel had known, or should have known, that the dog had vicious propensities. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Donkel.
ISSUES: Is there a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Donkel was liable for the dog kept on his property?
HOLDING: No, the trial court was correct in their summary judgment ruling. Scott urges that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Donkel knew about the dog’s dangerous propensities and was therefore liable for removing it from the premises and ensuring the surrounding areas were safe. Scott did not provide sufficient evidence that Donkel knew about the dog or was aware of any previous attacks. The court distinguished previous cases in which landlords were liable for conditions on adjacent streets, because in this case Donkel did no affirmative act to make the area unsafe. Because Scott could not establish that Donkel knew about the dog’s dangerous propensities and he did not do anything to make the area unsafe, the court ruled in favor of Donkel.
California
People v. Knoller
41 Cal.4th 139
Supreme Court of California, 2007
FACTS: Defendants, Marjorie Knoller and husband Robert Noel, owned two Presa Canario dogs, Bane and Hera, who previously belonged to an incarcerated client of theirs. The animals both weighed over 100 lbs and defendants had difficulty handling either animal. While living in their condo, the animals had several incidences of biting or threatening people and other animals. The defendants were notified by a veterinarian, behaviorist, and their neighbors that Bane and Hera were dangerous and should be muzzled and trained. The defendants did not take the advice and continued to walk the dogs without muzzle or other control devices. On January 26, 2001, Knoller was taking Bane back into the condo from a walk when Bane lunged towards neighbor Diane Whipple. Knoller lost control of Bane who subsequently mauled Whipple to death. A neighbor called 911, while Knoller claims she tried to stop Bane from attacking Whipple. The trial jury found Knoller guilty of second degree murder and both defendants guilty of involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts ruling and granted Knoller’s motion for a new trial on the second degree murder charges.
ISSUES: Did Knoller act with implied malice sufficient to uphold a second degree murder charge?
HOLDING: The trial court and Court of appeals used incorrect standards for implied malice. The trial court held that Knoller could only be convicted of second degree murder if she appreciated that her actions created a high probability of someone’s death. The Court of Appeals ruled this standard was too high and that Knoller could be convicted if she acted knowing that her actions created a high risk of bodily harm. The Supreme Court found both of these standards erroneous and concluded that implied malice can be inferred only if Knoller acted with conscious disregard to human life. The case was remanded to the trial court to see if Knoller’s actions fit the standard of implied malice necessary for a second degree murder charge.
California
Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management
143 Cal.App.4th 1360
Court of Appeals of California, First District, Division 1, 2006
FACTS: Plaintiff, Lila Chee, a resident of a condominium in the Marina Seagate complex, appealed from a judgment entered in favor of all defendants on her complaint seeking damages for personal injuries she suffered when a dog belonging to Olga Kiymaz, a tenant of another unit in the same complex, jumped on Chee. Chee named the property owner Jerome Brown, the Marina Seagate Home Owner’s Association, Amanda Goldt Property Management, and two of its property managers as defendant’s in her complaint after Kiymaz filed for bankruptcy and was dismissed from the complaint.
ISSUES: Did Brown, The Association, Amanda Goldt, or the property managers have a duty to protect Chee from Kiymaz’s dog?
HOLDING: No, none of the defendant’s had a duty to protect Chee from Kiymaz’s dog. Because there were no reported incidences and neither Chee nor Brown had ever seen the dog display any dangerous characteristics, Brown had no reason to believe that he was dangerous. The court ruled that Chee’s reliance on general breed characteristics was not enough to conclude that the dog had dangerous propensities. Landlords owe no duty of care to their tenants if they have no knowledge of the dog’s dangerous propensities. Further, none of the defendants had a duty to inspect the premises in search of a nuisance or dangerous dog.
California
Yuzon v. Collins
116 Cal.App.4th 149
Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division 1, 2004
FACTS: Plaintiff, minor Brian Yuzon, was bitten by a dog, Kemo, who resided with one of landlord Gerald Collin’s tenants. Yuzon alleged Collin’s liability due to his failure to warn or guard against the tenants’ dangerous dog. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Collin.
ISSUES: Is Collin’s knowledge of Kemo’s presence and behavior on the property enough to infer liability?
HOLDING: No, Collin is not liable because he did not have actual knowledge of Kemo’s dangerous propensity or any past attacks. While Collin did have knowledge of Kemo’s residency, he was unaware of any dangerous characteristics Kemo may have possessed. The law requires that liability only be inferred if circumstances were such that the landlord must have known of the dog’s viciousness, but it may not be inferred if he should have known or did not know. The Court affirmed the trial courts ruling.
California
Janush v. Charities Housing Development Corp.
169 F.Supp.2d 1133
United States District Court, N.D. California, 2000
FACTS: Plaintiff, Brenda Janush, signed a rental agreement for an apartment in Pensione Esperanza, a low-income building run by CDH, a non-profit corporation. The rental agreement contains a “no pet” clause. Janush did not alert CDH as to the presence of her animals prior to moving into the apartment. A maintenance worker discovered the animals and after an agreement as to the animals presence could not be reached, Janush was served with eviction papers. Janush suffers from a severe mental health disability. Janush’s psychiatrist testified that plaintiff’s pets, two birds and two cats, are necessary to her mental health. Janush is suing for discrimination under the Fair Housing Act.
ISSUES: Can possession of non-service animals be reasonable accommodations for disabled persons?
HOLDING: Yes, possession of a non-service animal may be a reasonable accommodation. The court rejected a bright line rule that would require an animal be a service animal to be considered a necessary accommodation. Instead, the court ruled that whether an animal is a necessary accommodation is a fact-specific inquiry in which costs and benefits specific to the case must be weighed. Summary judgment was denied and the case remanded for the lower court to analyze the burdens imposed on CDH and the benefits received by Janush.
California
Portillo v. Aiassa
27 Cal.App.4th 1128
Court of Appeals of California, Sixth District, 1994
FACTS: Plaintiff Anthony Portillo was delivering beer to Race Street Liquors when he was attacked by a German Shepherd. Portillo sustained serious injuries and brought a cause of action against the dog’s owner, John Kim, and the owner’s landlord, defendant Henry Aiassa. Kim rented the property on which the attack occurred from Aiassa, who renewed the lease on July 18,1988, without inspecting the property. Kim kept the dog on the property at all times, and there was another attack two weeks prior to Portillo’s. Kim posted a sign warning customers about the “guard dog” and also posted a newspaper article which described Kim’s dog as having a “rotten disposition”.
ISSUES: Was Aiassa responsible for inspecting the premises and removing Kim’s dog?
HOLDING: Yes, Aiassa was aware of the presence of Kim’s guard dog and is obligated to use reasonable care in inspecting the premises before renewing a lease. If Aiassa used reasonable care he would have found the guard dog sign and newspaper article posted about Kim’s dog. When discovering these signs, a reasonable person would then make inquiries as to the disposition of the dog and discovered the dangerous propensities. In this case reasonable care would lead Aiassa to have knowledge that there was a dangerous dog on the premises thus making him liable. This court does not infer strict liability, so if reasonable care would not lead to the discovery of a dangerous dog there would be no liability placed on the landlord.
Connecticut
Auster v. Norwalk United Methodist Church
94 Conn.App. 617
Appellate Court of Connecticut, 2006
FACTS: Virginia Auster sued the Norwalk United Methodist Church to recover for injuries caused by a dog that belonged to Pedro Salinas, an employee of the Church that rented an apartment on the premises. Auster was visiting the church for a meeting when she was bitten Salinas’ dog. The trial court ruled in favor of Auster, and the defendant appealed.
ISSUES: Was the Church strictly liable for the damages caused by Salinas’ dog?
HOLDING: No, the Church was not a keeper of the dog and was thus not strictly liable for Auster’s injuries. A keeper is defined in Connecticut statues as any person, other than the owner, harboring or having in his possession any dog. To harbor a dog is to afford lodging, shelter or refuge to it; possession is the exercise of dominion and control. The court found that because the Church did not care for the dog in any manner, and the dog resided only on the tenant’s living quarters that there was not enough evidence to prove that the defendant owned or harbored the dog. The case was remanded to trial for common-law negligence.
Connecticut
Housing Authority of the City of New London v. Tarrant
1997 WL 30320
Superior Court of Connecticut, 1997
FACTS: Defendant Tori Tarrant and her son housed a dog in their home. Neighbors complained to the Housing Authority that the dog was a nuisance; she had not been spayed, had no proof of vaccinations, had two litters of puppies that were kept in the dwelling, barked, and the Tarrants did not clean up after her. The Housing Authority sought to evict the animal, but Tarrant objected stating her son is mentally challenged and required the companionship of the dog pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Tarrant cited her son’s poor grades subsequent to losing the dog as proof that the dog was a reasonable accommodation to his disability.
ISSUES: Was there sufficient proof that the dog was a reasonable accommodation for Tarrant’s son’s disability under the Rehabilitation Act?
HOLDING: No, Tarrant did not offer psychological or medical proof that her son was mentally disabled and required a companion animal for that disability. Tarrant offered her son’s declining report cards as proof that the companion animal helped his mental disability. The court found that the grades were not sufficient evidence that her son had a mental disability or that the companion animal was a reasonable accommodation of that injury. The court held that psychological and medical evidence was needed to prove that Tarrant’s son had a disability and that the dog was a reasonable accommodation.
Federal
Parker v United States
393 F.Supp.2d 912
United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Central Division, 2005
FACTS: Marilyn Parker was bitten by a dog on October 20, 2001, in Mission, South Dakota, while on the grounds of housing units owned and maintained by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The dog that bit Parker belonged to tenant Roan Eagle’s daughter. The dog, “Cuddles,” was tethered to a garbage can and could not reach the end of the property. Parker was walking between the Roan Eagle house and their adjacent neighbor to attend a rummage sale on the Roan Eagle property when Cuddles came out from underneath a parked car and bit Parker. Parker was trying to avoid the dog as she had heard that the tenants kept watch dogs and “mean dogs”. Parker sustained a tear of her left lateral hand and a bruise on her leg. Parker’s complaint states a cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
ISSUES: Was the BIA negligent for failing to take reasonable action when having knowledge of a dangerous condition? Did BIA have an obligation to remove the dog from the property or to post warnings of the dog’s presence?
HOLDING: No, the BIA was not negligent and had no duty to remove the dog or post warnings of the dog’s presence. South Dakota follows the common law rule that a landlord that has parted with full possession of the premises to the tenant is not liable for injury to a third party, even if the injury is caused by the tenant’s negligence. The Roan Eagles had full possession and control of their home to the exclusion of the BIA. There is an exception to the common law rule where an undisclosed dangerous conditions exists at the time the lease is entered into which condition the lessor knew or should have known to exist. Parker must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that BIA knew or should have known that the Roan Eagles had dangerous dogs on the property. There were no complaints ever made about the Roan Eagles dogs to anyone in the BIA. Parker failed to meet her burden of proof.
Federal
Access Now, Inc. v. Town of Jasper, Tennessee
268 F.Supp.2d 973
United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Chattanooga, 2003
FACTS: Plaintiff, Pamela Kitchens, acting on behalf of her daughter, Tiffany Masterson, sued the town of Jasper, Tennessee, in which they reside. The town of Jasper fined Kitchens for violating a city ordinance by keeping a miniature horse in her home. Kitchens filed for a permit with the city asking for permission to keep the horse, but her request was declined. Kitchens claimed that the miniature horse was a service animal that helped her daughter, who suffers from spina bifida. Kitchens contended that Tiffany needed the horse to help her move around and that the town violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by not allowing Masterson to keep the miniature horse as a service animal.
ISSUES: Did the Town fail to provide a reasonable modification to Tiffany in violation of Title II of the ADA?
HOLDING: No, the town of Jasper did not violate the ADA. Plaintiffs failed to prove that Tiffany is disabled as defined in the ADA. The court rules that although Tiffany does have a disability, to be defined as disabled under the Act the plaintiffs must show that she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. Kitchens failed to prove this, and there was evidence that Tiffany had no problem walking, standing, or caring for herself. Kitchens also failed to prove that the miniature horse was a service animal under the ADA. The Act defines a service animal as any animal individually trained to do work or perform tasks for a disabled person. The court ruled that although the horse may have some training and be well behaved around Tiffany, it is not a service animal because it does not perform tasks for her benefit. The Court held that because Tiffany is not disabled under the ADA and the miniature horse is a pet and not a service animal, the Town did not violate the ADA and had no obligation to allow Kitchens to keep the horse in the house.
Florida
Bal Harbour Village v. Welsh
879 So.2d 1265
District Court of Appeals of Florida, Third District, 2004
FACTS: Bal Harbour Village, an incorporated village, enacted an ordinance that restricted the number of dogs a household could maintain. At the time the ordinance was enacted, William Walsh resided in the village and housed four dogs. The village enforced the ordinance by issuing citations to Walsh and attempting to force him to limit the number of dogs in his household. At the trial court, Walsh argued that the Ordinance could not be enforced against residents who had more than two dogs prior to enactment. The trial court agreed and Bal Harbour Village appealed.
ISSUES: Can the Ordinance, enacted pursuant to the Village’s police power to abate a nuisance, be constitutionally enforced against a Village resident who owned and housed more dogs than the established limit, prior to the enactment of the Ordinance?
HOLDING:
Yes, the Ordinance can be enforced. The Ordinance was enacted in response to nuisance complaints such as dogs roaming unleashed, dog bites, and excessive barking. The court recognizes governments’ ability to regulate animals within its police powers, and further states that a legislature has broad discretion to declare a particular activity a public nuisance and regulate it within its police power. To be declared unconstitutional a law must be arbitrary and not reasonable. The court held that because Welsh’s dogs were property they were subject to police power and the ordinance could be applied retroactively.
Florida
Tran v. Bancroft
648 So.2d 314
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, 1995
FACTS: A tenant’s next door neighbor was attacked by tenant’s dog when the dog leaped over the fence and bit the neighbor off of the leased property. The neighbor sued the landlord of the property under a common law negligence claim.
ISSUES: Can a landlord be held liable for an attack by a tenant’s dog that occurs away from the leased premises on property that is not owned by the landlord?
HOLDING: A landlord has no duty to prevent injuries to third parties caused by a tenant’s dog away from leased premises. Although the landlord in this case knew that his tenant kept a vicious dog, the dog could escape from the premises, and he had control over whether the dog could reside on the leased property, there is no liability for the dog’s actions off of the leased premises.
Florida
American Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Dade County, Fla.
728 F.Supp. 1533
United States District Court, S.D. Florida,1989
FACTS: Dade County Florida passed an ordinance regulating pit bull dogs. The ordinance requires registration, enclosure or leashing and muzzling of pit bulls. The ordinance defines pit bulls as any dog that substantially conforms to the breed standards as set by the American Kennel Club and United Kennel Club. Plaintiffs, including Robert Sanchez who owns two dogs that may be subject to the ordinance, contend that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional.
ISSUES: Is the definition of pit bull dog in the ordinance so vague that it is a violation of the federal constitution?
HOLDING: No, the ordinance does not violate the constitution. The court held that because there are breed standards in dictionaries, dog breed books, and standards set forth by the American Kennel Club and United Kennel Club that a reasonable person would be able to identify whether their dog qualifies as a pit bull and is thus regulated by the ordinance.
Georgia
Rawnez v. Roberts
2004 WL 1405703
Court of Appeals of Georgia, 2004
FACTS: After being attacked by her neighbor’s four pit bulls, Helene Rawnez sued her tenant neighbor and the owner of the rental property, Scott Roberts. Roberts was an out-of-possession landlord renting the residence to the tenant under a purchase option agreement. The trial court held that because Roberts had relinquished control of the premises to the tenant he could not be held liable. Rawnez appealed the trial court decision.
ISSUES: Does an out-of-possession landlord have liability for a tenant’s dog bites?
HOLDING: No, the trail court was correct in holding that under OCGA § 44-7-14 an out-of-possession landlord does not have liability for torts resulting from the tenant’s negligence. This is so because the tenant has the right to use the premises as he wished during the term it was rented. Further, Roberts reserving the right to inspect or repair the house without notice did not mean that he did not fully part with the leased premises. The out-of-possession landlord could only be held liable if the damages were a result of negligible repair or defective construction on the property. In this case, the pit bull dogs were out of the yard because a relative of the tenant’s failed to keep them enclosed in the fence or garage. The attack was not due to the landlord’s negligence and he cannot be held liable.
Hawaii
DuBois v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua
453 F.3d 1175
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2006
FACTS: Condominium residents and roommates Dubois and Prindable sued the condo association under the Fair Housing Act for the association’s failure to exempt their English Bulldog Einstein under the condominium association’s no-pet rule.
ISSUES: Did the condo association discriminate against plaintiffs when they refused to allow them to keep Einstein as a reasonable accommodation for one of the tenant’s mental illness?
HOLDING: No, the District Court’s motion to dismiss is upheld. Plaintiff Prindable adequately established his handicap through various letters from physicians asserting he has depression and anxiety and that a companion animal is a viable treatment option. The FHA includes service animals as necessary accommodations, but the court uses a common understanding of service animal to include only guide dogs or animals with special training. The fact that Einstein provided comfort to Prindable was not enough to establish him as a service animal; his lack of individual training excludes him from that category. The court further found that by temporarily allowing Einstein to reside in plaintiffs’ condo, the association had not yet discriminated against Prindable.
Illinois
Klitzka ex rel. Teutonico v. Hellios
348 Ill.App.3d 594
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, 2004
FACTS: Plaintiff, Alexus Klitzka, and her mother visited the home of Mark and Amanda Hellios, where Alexus was bitten in the face by the couple’s dog, Haley. Mark and Amanda leased the home from Mark’s parents, defendant’s Michael and Trudy Hellios. Alexus filed a complained alleging that Michael and Trudy knew or should have known that Haley was dangerous and therefore breached a duty to warn and protect her. Michael and Trudy moved for summary judgment, arguing they were landlords who had no control over the premises and owed Alexus no duty. The trial court granted summary judgment for Michael and Trudy. Alexus appealed.
ISSUES: Under what circumstances does a landlord owe a duty of care to his tenant's invitees to prevent injury from an attack by an animal kept by the tenant on the leased premises?
HOLDING: The Court affirms the trial court holding that even if Michael and Trudy knew the dog was dangerous, they had no duty to protect Alexus because they retained no control over the portion of the premises where the injury occurred. Alexus argued that because the tenant contract was month to month, Michael and Trudy had the ability to coerce the removal of the animal by threatening to terminate the lease. The court held that even if a landlord has control over the premises in this manner the landlords would not be liable.
New York
Bemiss v. Acken
273 A.D.2d 332
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York, 2000
FACTS: Plaintiff’s dropped their infant Ashley at the house of Terry and Robert Williams where they operated an in-home daycare. The Williams’ rented their property from defendant Acken. The Williams’ dog bit Ashley while at daycare, and plaintiffs seek to recover damages from the landlord under a theory of strict liability.
ISSUES: Is Acken strictly liable for a dog bite that occurred on property he leased to the Williams?
HOLDING: No, Acken is not strictly liable because he had no knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities. In order for a landlord to be held strictly liable for a dog bite, plaintiffs must prove that the landlord had actual knowledge that the dog was being kept on the leased premises and the dog had vicious propensities. The plaintiffs failed to establish that Acken knew of any dangerous propensities the dog may have possessed.
New York
Crossroads Apartments Associates v. LeBoo
152 Misc.2d 830
City Court of Rochester, 1991
FACTS: Landlord, Crossroads Apartments Associates, seek to evict tenant Kenneth LeBoo for possession of a cat in conflict with the lease that prohibits tenants from keeping pets in the apartment at all times. LeBoo contends that he has a mental illness and the cat is necessary for him to cope with the illness and the eviction is a violation of the Fair Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act.
ISSUES: Was there enough evidence to conclude that eviction did not violate the Fair Housing Act or Rehabilitation Act in summary judgment?
HOLDING: No, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the cat is necessary for LeBoo’s use and enjoyment of his apartment thus making summary judgment inappropriate. The court ruled that in order to establish that there was a violation of the Fair Housing Act or Rehabilitation Act LeBoo would need to establish that he has an emotional and psychological attachment to the cat which requires him to keep the cat in the apartment. LeBoo submitted affidavits from individuals who made this claim, which were in opposition to the affidavits made by Crossroads’ psychologist. This conflict demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact; the court remanded to the trial court to decide this factual dispute.
North Carolina
Holcomb v. Colonial Associates, L.L.C.
358 N.C. 501
Supreme Court of North Carolina, 2004
FACTS: Colonial Associates, L.L.C owned 13 acres of property, on which John Olson rented a house. The lease allowed Olson to keep two Rottweilers on his property, subject to a provision that allowed Colonial to instruct Olson to remove the dogs in the event that Colonial deemed the dogs a nuisance, disturbance, or undesirable. The dogs had previously attacked a neighbor and a neighbor’s friend; both incidences were reported to Colonial. Plaintiff Holcomb is a developer that was interested in Colonial’s property. He entered the property and rang the doorbell to Olson’s house and was subsequently attacked by the dogs. The Court of Appeals found that plaintiff did not demonstrate that Colonial was the owner or keeper of the dogs that attacked him, and Colonial was therefore not liable.
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals err in finding that the plaintiff was required to show that Colonial was an owner or keeper of the dog in order to show that Colonial was negligent?
HOLDING: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Colonial had to be an owner or keeper of the dog in order to show that Colonial was negligent. The requirement that one be an owner or keeper of a dog to be liable for that dog is true in the case of strict liability, but not common-law negligence cases. The court found that Colonial was negligent in not requiring the tenant to remove or restrain his dogs, when Colonial knew, or had reason to know, that the dogs were a threat. The contractual provision that gave Colonial the power to remove the dogs from the premises convinced the court that Colonial was contractually obligated to retain control over the dogs.
South Dakota
City of Marion v Schoenwald
631 N.W.2d 213
Supreme Court of South Dakota, 2001
FACTS: To keep excessive numbers of large dogs from becoming a public nuisance, the City of Marion passed an ordinance that, among other things, limited households to four dogs, only two of which could weigh over 25 pounds. Diane Schoenwald resides in Marion with her family. Her family owns three dogs that were properly licensed and vaccinated. Although at the time the ordinance was passed the dogs weighed 75 pounds, 30 pounds, and 20 pounds, the smaller dog apparently put on additional weight by the time of the suit. In February of 2000 Showenwald was notified that by housing three dogs weighting over 25 pounds she was in violation of the ordinance. Schoenwald refused to remove her dogs and was issued a citation. Schoenwald asserts that the weight restriction violated her due process rights under the South Dakota Constitution and exceeded the City’s authority. The lower court agreed that the weight restriction was unconstitutional and the City appealed.
ISSUES: Was the weight restriction unconstitutional?
HOLDING: No, South Dakota law permits municipalities broad power to regulate the keeping of dogs, and thus the weight limitation included in the City’s comprehensive pet ordinance was within its authority. Municipal ordinances are presumed to be constitutionally valid, and those contesting them have a heavy burden in proving that they are unreasonable and arbitrary. The Court held the weight restriction read together with the freedom to possess four dogs, two of which can be any size, is sufficiently related to the purpose of protecting public health and safety; thus, it did not unreasonably exceed the City’s regulatory authority. The ordinance is upheld; the lower court's ruling is reversed.
West Virginia
In re Kenna Homes Cooperative Corporation
210 W.Va. 380
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 2001
FACTS: J.L and Bernice Jessup purchased a home from Kenna Homes Cooperative to live in with their Yorkie dog. Subsequent to their move, Kenna Homes passed a by-law that prohibited the purchase of new companion animals, with the exception of properly trained service animals. When the Jessup’s Yorkie died, they obtained two new dogs. The Jessups petitioned Kenna Homes to allow the dogs as a reasonable accommodation to their disabilities. Kenna Homes denied the petition and filed a petition for declaratory judgment.
ISSUES: Does the requirement that a service animal be properly trained violate the Fair Housing Act?
HOLDING: No, the provision that a service animal be properly trained is valid. The court held that it is valid to require that a service animal be individually trained and work for the benefit of the disabled person in order to be considered a reasonable accommodation of that person’s disability. The person claiming the need for the service animal has the burden of proving these requirements. Further, a landlord may require the disabled tenant to produce in writing proof from the trainer that the animal has been individually trained, and a statement from a licensed physician, specializing in that disability, that the service animal in question is a necessary for that person’s disability.