Constitutional Issues
Federal (U.S.)
Bakay v. Yarnes
431 F.Supp.2d 1103
US District Court, W.D. Washington, at Tacoma, 2006
FACTS: After receiving complaints about the living conditions of more than 70 cats in the Bakay’s care, authorities obtained a search warrant and seized approximately 68 cats. Mr. Bakay asked authorities if they intended to euthanize the cats and was assured that no harm would come to them as along as Bakay complied with the notice authorities gave him, which indicated that he had 15 days to petition in court for the cats’ return. However, after being examined by a veterinarian, 42 of the cats were ordered to be euthanized. Later, authorities served a search warrant on the Bakays’ veterinarian and seized 2 additional cats belonging to the Bakays, one of which was later euthanized. The remaining 27 cats were returned to the Bakays. As a result of the seizure and destruction of the cats, the Bakays alleged violations of the 4th, 5th, and 14th amendments, simple and gross negligence, respondeat superior, conversion and trespass to chattels, breach of bailment contract, outrage, statutory waste, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortuous interference with business expectancy.
ISSUES: Whether Veterinarian Schramm and Clallam County Humane Society were negligent in destroying the cats in question; whether the Bakays’ civil rights, including procedural due process, substantive due process, 4th, 5th, 14th amendment, and state constitutional rights have been violated; whether the Bakays have a legally cognizable claim for trespass to chattels or conversion; whether a bailment contract was formed and breached; whether the Bakays have a legally cognizable claim for the tort of outrage, statutory waste, or tortuous interference with a business expectancy.
HOLDINGS:
1) Euthanasia is allowed at any time for animals seized by the government where they are deemed to be severely injured, diseased, or suffering.
2) The Washington statute under which the animals were seized states that law enforcement officers and licensed veterinarians shall be immune from civil and criminal liability for actions taken under RCW 16.52.210 if reasonable prudence is exercised in carrying out the provisions.
3) There is no credible evidence that defendants were negligent in their examinations, and no credible evidence that the cats in question were not severely injured, diseased, or suffering.
4) The Bakays’ due process rights were not violated; to hold that notice and a hearing are required before an animal that is severely suffering can be euthanized is to rewrite the law.
5) The rest of the Bakays’ claims alleging violations of their rights under the federal and state constitutions are ambiguous and lack merit.
6) No cause of action for trespass to chattels or conversion exists if a defendant has legal authority to seize or take dominion over a plaintiff’s property. No credible evidence exists to suggest that defendants acted negligently in carrying out their duties, or exceeded their authority in this case and therefore, the Bakays have no legally cognizable action for trespass to chattels or conversion.
7) Any notice given by the officers that the Bakays could petition the court for the return of the cats within 15 days does not constitute a promise that the cats would be returned, just notice that they could seek a potential remedy through the court system.
8) The same statute that gave the Bakays the right to petition the court within 15 days also give the state the right to euthanize animals that are suffering at any time. Consequently, a bailment contract was not created when the cats were seized, and not violated when the cats were euthanized.
9) The Bakays claim of outrage must fail because they have failed to show that the actions taken by defendants were outrageous in any way, that they have suffered severe emotional distress as a result, or that they were present when the cats were euthanized.
10) There is no evidence whatsoever to support the Bakays’ statutory waste claim.
11) The Bakays’ claim of breach of fiduciary duty must fail because no Washington court has recognized the existence of a constructive trust imposed on law enforcement officers after lawfully seizing evidence pursuant to a warrant.
12) No credible evidence exists in the record to suggest that defendants interfered with the Bakays’ business for an improper purpose or used improper means.
Federal (U.S.)
Doris Day Animal League, et al. v. Veneman, USDA, et al.
315 F.3d 297
US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 2003
FACTS: The Animal Welfare Act (AWA) requires certain animal “dealers” to be licensed and to submit to inspections. The Act, which is administered by the USDA, exempts “retails pet stores” from these requirements. The Secretary of Agriculture defines “retail pet store” as “any outlet where only the following animals are sold or offered for sale, at retail for use as pets: dogs, cats, rabbits, guinea pigs, hamsters, gerbils, rats, mice, gophers, chinchilla, domestic ferrets, domestic farm animals, birds, and coldblooded species.” Thus, breeders who sell dogs from their residences are exempt from licensing and inspections proscribed by the AWA. The Doris Day Animal League filed a rulemaking petition with the Agriculture Department, urging a change in the Secretary of Agriculture’s regulatory definition of “retail pet store” so that residential operations would not be exempted. When the Secretary announced that he would retain the definition, the Doris Day Animal League and other organizations and individuals concerned about the mistreatment of dogs brought an action for judicial review. The district court held the USDA’s regulation of “retail pet stores” invalid because the definition did not include one who sells dogs for use as pets for his residence. Defendants appealed.
ISSUES: What did Congress intend “retail pet store” to mean; whether the USDA’s interpretation of “retail pet store” was reasonable.
HOLDINGS:
1) The legislative history reveals that the emphasis of the Animal Welfare Act was on regulation of wholesale, not retail, sellers of animals.
2) The definition of “dealer” has 2 exceptions: 1) retail pet store, 2) any person who does not sell, or negotiate the purchase or sale of any wild animal, dog, or cat, and who derives no more than $500 gross income from the sale of other animals during any calendar year.
3) The Secretary’s decision and policy statement declining to modify its regulatory definition of “retail pet store” is supported with reasoning that is persuasive and faithful to the Act’s purpose of protecting animal welfare. The regulation is a permissible construction of the statutory term “retail pet store.”
Federal (U.S.)
Brown v. Muhlenberg Township
269 F.3d 205
U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 2001
FACTS: The Browns’ three year old Rottweiler, Immi, had been place in the Browns’ fenced yard. Although the Browns had not secured a dog license for her, Immi wore a bright pink, one inch wide collar with many tags: a rabies, microchip, guardian angel, and identification tag along with the Browns’ address and telephone number, and the Browns’ prior Rottweiler’s lifetime license. Unbeknownst to the Browns, the latch on the back gate of their fence had failed, and Immi had wandered into the adjacent parking lot beyond the fence. Eventually Officer Eberly came upon Immi. After calling to her, he walked to a position 10 to 12 feet from her. According to a stranger observing from his car, Immi was stationary, not growling or barking and did not display any aggressive behavior towards the officer and never tried to attack him. At this point, Mrs. Brown looked out of an open screened window of her house and saw what was occurring. She shouted out “That’s my dog, don’t shoot!” Officer Eberly hesitated a few seconds and then pointed his gun at Immi. Mrs. Brown tried to break through the window’s screen and screamed, “No!” The officer then fired 5 shots at Immi, killing her. The Browns brought this action against Officer Eberly, the township, and chiefs of police, alleging violations of their 4th and 14th Amendment rights and alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment motion and the Browns appealed.
ISSUES: Whether the Browns right to be free from unreasonable governmental seizures of their property was violated; whether Officer Eberly is entitled to qualified immunity; whether the destruction of Immi deprived the Browns of their property when they were entitled to due process; whether the Browns have satisfied their burden of establishing facts sufficient to support their claim of municipal liability; whether the Browns have established the existence of an unconstitutional governmental custom; whether the Browns have established a failure to train claim; whether Police Chiefs Flanagan and Smith are responsible for Officer Eberly’s constitutional torts; whether the Browns are entitled to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
HOLDINGS:
1) This court joins two of its sister courts or appeals in holding that the killing of a person’s dog by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure under the 4th Amendment.
2) When the state claims a right to make a warrantless seizure, the court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 4th Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.
3) If the facts asserted by the Browns are found to be true, we conclude that a reasonable officer in Officer Eberly’s position could not have applied these well established principles to the situation before him and have concluded that he could lawfully destroy a pet who posed no imminent danger and whose owners were known, available, and desirous of assuming custody.
4) Officer Eberly has not established that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
5) It follows that Officer Eberly’s destruction of Immi deprived the Browns of their property and that they were entitled to due process.
6) Contrary to the Browns’ suggestion, this court concludes that no predeprivation process was constitutionally required here; summary judgment was properly entered against the Browns on their procedural due process claim.
7) The Browns have not satisfied their burden of establishing facts sufficient to support their claim of municipal liability because they have tendered no evidence of any official policy endorsing Officer Eberly’s conduct.
8) The Browns have not established the existence of an unconstitutional governmental custom.
9) The Browns have not established evidence to support their failure to train claim.
10) The elements to establish a supervisory liability claim have not been established.
11) The court in Banasczek held that Pennsylvania recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and rejected the contention that the killing of a pet under any circumstances would not be recognized by the Pennsylvania courts as extreme or outrageous.
12) This court predicts that the Pennsylvania courts would permit a trier of fact to return a verdict for the plaintiff in an intentional infliction of emotional distress case where it can be shown that a police officer’s attention was called to the severe emotional distress of the pet’s owner, he hesitated before shooting, and he then attempted to fire five bullets into the pet within the owner’s view and without justification.
13) Officer Eberly is not entitled to sovereign immunity under state law with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the record will support a conclusion that he acted intentionally.