Animal Cruelty/Abuse: Domestic Abuse
California
People v. Alvarado
23 Cal.Rptr.3d 391
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California, 2005
FACTS: Appellant Manuel Alvarado lived with his girlfriend Mary Duarte, her brother Gregory Ballew, and their three dogs. On December 6, 2002, while Duarte was at work, Alvarado and Ballew stayed at the apartment and split an 18-pack of beer. They then went to a bar and drank another pitcher. Upon returning home, Ballew stayed outside to smoke a cigarette and Alvarado went into the apartment. When Ballew went inside the apartment he saw specks of blood on the ground and heard noise coming from the bathroom. When he entered the bathroom he found Alvarado crying and mumbling as he rinsed Gizmo, one of the dogs. Gizmo was covered in blood. Ballew punched Alvarado, grabbed one of the remaining three dogs, and went to Duarte’s workplace. Still drunk, Ballew told Duarte that Alvarado was killing Gizmo and that she needed to call the sheriff’s department. Duarte called her apartment repeatedly with no answer, and then called the sheriff. In the meantime, Alvarado showed up at Duarte’s work, crying and saying that another dog, Pyro, was dead. When Duarte asked what had happened, Alvarado just kept repeating that his “baby” was dead. Duarte sent Alvarado home and called the sheriff again. Deputy sheriffs arrived at the apartment and found Alvarado there, smelling of alcohol. They entered the apartment and found Gizmo, vomiting, bleeding, and wet, cowering in the bathtub. The deputy sheriffs then called Duarte, who told them about Pyro. When the sheriffs questioned Alvarado about Pyro, he claimed to not know where he was and then said that Pyro must have run away. Alvarado took the officers to certain sheds on the property, but not to the one where they later found Pyro’s dead body. Alvarado denied that he had injured Pyro or Gizmo. After Gizmo died a few days later, necropsies revealed that both dogs had suffered multiple stab wounds leading to their deaths. After a mistrial, a jury convicted Alvarado of two counts of animal cruelty and sentenced him to two years in prison. Alvarado appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in its jury instructions by not requiring the jury to find that Alvarado acted with the specific intent to maim, mutilate, torture, wound or kill a living animal.
HOLDING: No, the court did not err in the jury instructions it gave. The anti-cruelty statute at issue in this case is a general intent statute, and therefore the court did not need to instruct the jury that Alvarado must have acted with specific intent to maim, mutilate, torture, wound or kill a living animal.
Illinois
People v. Soliday
729 N.E.2d 527
Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, 2000
FACTS: In March 1998, defendant Soliday shot his Rottweiler Tritan multiple times with a handgun after the dog urinated and defecated in Soliday’s residence. Soliday had adopted Tritan from the Champaign County Rottweiler Rescue (RR), and he initially informed RR that Tritan had been hit and killed by a car. Soliday later admitted that he had shot and killed Tritan, and returned his body to RR in a bloody, debris-covered sheet. The State of Illinois charged Soliday with criminal damage to property. Soliday moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted Soliday’s motion. The State appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the trial the trial court erred in dismissing the charge of criminal damage to property.
HOLDING: Yes, the trial court did err in dismissing the State’s charge of criminal damage to property. Neither a trial court nor an appellate court can evaluate the evidence that the parties might present at trial when determining whether dismissal because of procedural pleading requirements is appropriate. Here the information the State presented did meet the pleading requirements. The dispute as to whether RR or Soliday owned Tritan did not entitle Soliday to dismissal of the charge of criminal damage to property. Therefore, the trial court’s dismissal is reversed and the case is remanded.
Indiana
Hall v. State of Indiana
791 N.E.2d 257
Court of Appeals of Indiana, 2003
FACTS: On December 30, 2000, a police officer witnessed Mark and Chris Hall shoot a cat approximately 20 times with a rifle. When the police officer approached, he found the cat had been hit numerous times and was dead. The State charged both Mark and Chris with cruelty to an animal. Chris and Mark were each convicted of cruelty to an animal, a Class A misdemeanor. Mark was also convicted of dealing in a sawed-off shotgun, a Class D felony. Chris was sentenced to one year suspended and to be served on probation and Mark was sentenced to three years incarceration, with six months executed and to be served in a work-release program and thirty months suspended and to be served on probation. Defendants appealed claiming 1) no evidence was presented at trial that a shotgun was used as alleged in the charging information, 2) the allegation in indictment that 30 projectiles were fired into the cat was inconsistent with the evidence, and 3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that defendants mutilated the cat.
ISSUES: Whether variance between the information charging defendant with cruelty to an animal, which alleged use of a shotgun, and the proof adduced at trial, which was that defendant used a rifle, required reversal; whether the variance between the allegation in the indictment and the proof adduced at trial regarding how many times defendant shot the cat was fatal to state’s case; whether sufficient evidence existed to support the conclusion that defendants mutilated the cat.
HOLDINGS:
1) There was no indication in the record that defendant objected to variance of evidence regarding what type of gun was used. Failure to make a specific objection at trial waives any material variance issue. Furthermore, the means used to commit animal cruelty is not an element of the crime. Any variance between the pleading and the proof did not require reversal.
2) The means used to mutilate a cat is not an element of the crime. Defendants were not harmed by any variance between the charging information and the proof presented as to how many times the cat was shot.
3) Although shooting an animal once and killing it instantaneously does not constitute mutilation, the evidence here reveals that the cat was hit multiple times. From this a reasonable jury could conclude that the cat was mutilated, i.e., altered radically so as to be made imperfect.
4) The act of shooting an animal more than once is not mutilation per se; each case will be judged on its individual circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Maine
State v. Witham
876 A.2d 40
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2005
FACTS: Defendant John Witham lived part-time with his girlfriend. On February 26, 2004, Witham, who claimed to be allergic to cats, got into an argument with his girlfriend over whether the girlfriend’s pregnant cat would continue to reside in the apartment. Later that evening, the girlfriend found Witham sitting in his truck with the cat in a carrier next to him. Witham then started screaming at the girlfriend that she had to choose him or the cat. He held the cat carrier out the window of the truck, and finally dropped it on the driveway. He then proceeded to run over the cat carrier and kill the pregnant cat. A neighbor testified that he heard Witham howling with laughter as he drove away. At trial Witham was convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals. He filed this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the aggravated cruelty to animals statute is unconstitutionally void for vagueness because the phrase “manifesting a depraved indifference to animal life or suffering” provides no intelligible standard to guide individual conduct.
HOLDING: No, the aggravated cruelty to animals statute is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. When viewed objectively, Witham’s conduct could be found by a reasonable jury to demonstrate an almost total lack of concern or feeling for the value of animal life.
Missouri
State of Missouri v. Roberts
8 S.W.3d 124
Missouri Court of Appeals, 1999
FACTS: Roberts’ dog ran away when Roberts stepped on it. When he called the dog to come back, the dog did not listen. Roberts then beat the dog to death. A postmortem exam revealed that trauma, some hemorrhage and pain and poor heart function from heartworms triggered the dog’s death. Five of the dog’s ribs were broken and the ends of the ribs tore into the surrounding muscles and severed arteries. Several large bruises, not visible externally, were found in the tissue under the skin of the abdomen as well as subcutaneous bruises above the dog’s right hip. A question remained as to whether or not Roberts sodomized the dog. In order to find a defendant guilty of felony animal abuse, the state must show that an animal’s suffering was the result of torture and mutilation. A jury determined that the state met its burden and found Roberts guilty of felony animal abuse. The circuit court set aside the jury’s verdict stating that “mutilation” requires some sort of external injury, that there be some scarring or that there be some kind of destruction to a limb or other part of the body. It entered judgment against Roberts for misdemeanor animal abuse instead.
ISSUES: Whether Section 578.012 of Missouri law mandates that “mutilation” requires some sort of external injury, that there be some scarring or that there be some kind of destruction to a limb or other part of the body; whether the evidence presented established that the dog’s suffering was the result of torture and mutilation for purposes of finding Roberts’ guilty of felony animal abuse.
HOLDINGS:
1) The MO General Assembly intended the courts to interpret the definition of “mutilation” by giving the term its plain and ordinary meaning; thus, the definition of “mutilation” does not exclude internal injuries.
2) To beat a dog until its ribs are so broken that they not only do not function to protect chest organs but cut and destroy surrounding muscles and arteries constitutes mutilation. To beat a dog for at least an hour constitutes torture. The jury had a sound basis for finding Roberts guilty of felony animal abuse. The Appellate Court reversed stating that the definition of “mutilation” does not exclude internal injuries.
Missouri
State v. Hill
996 S.W.2d 544
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, 1999
FACTS: On April 21, 1996 police officers arrived at a residence after receiving a call from the Suicide Prevention Hotline. Upon arrival police officers spoke with resident Diane White, who told the officers that she was concerned about her friend, defendant Vicki Hill, who had killed a litter of cats. White was watching Hill’s six year old son, who appeared scared and upset and who confirmed that his mother had killed six cats by stabbing them. The officers went to Hill’s house, and after confirming that she was not in imminent danger, began to question her about the cats. Though initially Hill claimed that she had dumped the cats in a parking lot, police officers noticed a brown car in the driveway with a bag in the passenger seat leaking blood. When the officers asked Hill if the cats were in the car, Hill admitted that they were and was arrested. A grand jury indicted Hill for purposely causing suffering to six cats as a result of torture and mutilation consciously inflicted while the animals were alive. At trial the jury found Hill guilty of misdemeanor animal abuse. Hill appeals.
ISSUES: 1) Whether Hill, as the owner of the cats, was exempt from prosecution for stabbing the cats to death and 2) whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Hill purposely and intentionally caused injury and suffering to her cats.
HOLDINGS: 1) No, Hill was not exempt from prosecution for stabbing her own cats to death. Owners of animals are only exempt from being charged with violation of the act by “killing” their animals, not from being charged with purposely or intentionally causing injury or suffering to the animals. 2) Yes, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find Hill guilty of purposely and intentionally caused injury and suffering to her cats. By stabbing the mother cat out of rage, and then attempting to put the cat out of her misery by slicing her open from throat to groin, as well as stabbing each of the kittens at least four times, Hill established beyond a reasonable doubt that her purpose was to inflict injury and suffering on the animals.
New York
People v. Garcia
29 A.D.3d 255
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York, 2006
FACTS: 0n August 2, 2003, Emelie Martinez was living in an apartment with defendant Michael Garcia, her three children, and an 18-year-old high school student. There were also two dogs, a cat, and three goldfish living in the apartment. Around 3:00 a.m., Martinez awoke on the sofa to find Garcia standing over her, holding the fish tank. When she asked him what he was doing, Garcia threw the fish tank into the television set, saying, “That could have been you.” A little later, as Garcia and Martinez were cleaning up the mess, one of Martinez’s children, Juan, came out of his room with his sisters behind him. At this point Garcia turned to Juan and said, “You want to see something awesome?” and proceeded to stomp on Juan’s goldfish, killing the fish instantly. The next day Garcia attacked Martinez, and then attacked the high school student and Juan. Garcia was arrested later that day. The trial court convicted Garcia of attempted assault in the second degree, third-degree criminal possession of a weapon, third-degree criminal mischief, three counts of third-degree assault, three counts of endangering the welfare of a child, and aggravated cruelty to animals. Garcia appeals.
ISSUES: Whether the definition of “companion animal” in the statute prohibiting aggravated cruelty to animals is unconstitutionally vague.
HOLDINGS: No, the definition of “companion animal” in the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The statute is sufficiently clear as to apprise a person of ordinary intelligence that stomping a pet goldfish to death comes within the statute’s prohibition. That pet goldfish are to be considered “companion animals” is clearly within the meaning of the statute.