Appellate Court of Illinois, 2005

FACTS: Anzalone’s cat was attacked and killed by a rottweiler while boarded at the Kragness Animal Hospital. Anzalone brought an action against the veterinarian and the animal hospital for breach of bailment, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The circuit held that Anzalone failed to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and dismissed the count. Defendants also argued that Anzalone’s prayer for relief for compensatory damages in excess of $100,000 was not based on the market value of the cat or other permissible factors. The circuit court agreed and struck down Anzalone’s complaint for its failure to adequately plead damages.

ISSUES: Whether the circuit court erred in dismissing Anzalone’s complaint for failure to adequately allege damages.

HOLDINGS:

1) Defendant Kragness’s challenge to Anzalone’s valuation of damages is not fatal to the cause of action

because Anzalone adequately alleged the existence of damages. It would be inappropriate to dismiss the complaint merely because Anzalone’s prayer for relief was deemed extravagant.

2) No IL statute provides for a wrongful death-type cause of action for the negligent killing of a pet, and in the eyes of the common law, a pet is an item of personal property. This view still prevails in almost all jurisdictions, although deemed outdated by animal law scholars.

3) It is well established that it is not necessary for the maintenance of an action for killing a pet, that it should be shown to be of any pecuniary value. It is for the jury to be the judge of the value.

4) While at trial the plaintiff bears the burden of providing evidence which affords some reasonable basis for ascertaining the “value to the owner” so as to enable the trier of fact to exercise his or her judgment, there is no such requirement under IL law with respect to pleading damages.

Federal

Bakay v. Yarnes

431 F.Supp.2d 1103

US District Court, W.D. Washington, at Tacoma, 2006

FACTS: After receiving complaints about the living conditions of more than 70 cats in the Bakay’s care, authorities obtained a search warrant and seized approximately 68 cats. Mr. Bakay asked authorities if they intended to euthanize the cats and was assured that no harm would come to them as along as Bakay complied with the notice authorities gave him, which indicated that he had 15 days to petition in court for the cats’ return. However, after being examined by a veterinarian, 42 of the cats were ordered to be euthanized. Later, authorities served a search warrant on the Bakays’ veterinarian and seized 2 additional cats belonging to the Bakays, one of which was later euthanized. The remaining 27 cats were returned to the Bakays. As a result of the seizure and destruction of the cats, the Bakays alleged violations of the 4th, 5th, and 14th amendments, simple and gross negligence, respondeat superior, conversion and trespass to chattels, breach of bailment contract, outrage, statutory waste, breach of fiduciary duty, and tortuous interference with business expectancy.

ISSUES: Whether Veterinarian Schramm and Clallam County Humane Society were negligent in destroying the cats in question; whether the Bakays’ civil rights, including procedural due process, substantive due process, 4th, 5th, 14th amendment, and state constitutional rights have been violated; whether the Bakays have a legally cognizable claim for trespass to chattels or conversion; whether a bailment contract was formed and breached; whether the Bakays have a legally cognizable claim for the tort of outrage, statutory waste, or tortuous interference with a business expectancy.

HOLDINGS:

1) Euthanasia is allowed at any time for animals seized by the government where they are deemed to be severely injured, diseased, or suffering.

2) The Washington statute under which the animals were seized states that law enforcement officers and licensed veterinarians shall be immune from civil and criminal liability for actions taken under RCW 16.52.210 if reasonable prudence is exercised in carrying out the provisions.

3) There is no credible evidence that defendants were negligent in their examinations, and no credible evidence that the cats in question were not severely injured, diseased, or suffering.

4) The Bakays’ due process rights were not violated; to hold that notice and a hearing are required before an animal that is severely suffering can be euthanized is to rewrite the law.

5) The rest of the Bakays’ claims alleging violations of their rights under the federal and state constitutions are ambiguous and lack merit.

6) No cause of action for trespass to chattels or conversion exists if a defendant has legal authority to seize or take dominion over a plaintiff’s property. No credible evidence exists to suggest that defendants acted negligently in carrying out their duties, or exceeded their authority in this case and therefore, the Bakays have no legally cognizable action for trespass to chattels or conversion.

7) Any notice given by the officers that the Bakays could petition the court for the return of the cats within 15 days does not constitute a promise that the cats would be returned, just notice that they could seek a potential remedy through the court system.

8) The same statute that gave the Bakays the right to petition the court within 15 days also give the state the right to euthanize animals that are suffering at any time. Consequently, a bailment contract was not created when the cats were seized, and not violated when the cats were euthanized.

9) The Bakays claim of outrage must fail because they have failed to show that the actions taken by defendants were outrageous in any way, that they have suffered severe emotional distress as a result, or that they were present when the cats were euthanized.

10) There is no evidence whatsoever to support the Bakays’ statutory waste claim.

11) The Bakays’ claim of breach of fiduciary duty must fail because no Washington court has recognized the existence of a constructive trust imposed on law enforcement officers after lawfully seizing evidence pursuant to a warrant.

12) No credible evidence exists in the record to suggest that defendants interfered with the Bakays’ business for an improper purpose or used improper means.

New York

Brousseau v. Rosenthal

110 Misc.2d 1054

Civil Court, City of New York, 1980

FACTS: Brousseau delivered her healthy, 8 year old dog for boarding at Dr. Rosenthal’s kennel on 7/28/79. When she returned to the kennel on 8/10/79, she was told that the dog had died on 8/6/79. In the bailment for mutual benefit, Rosenthal was held only to a standard of ordinary care. Nevertheless, Rosenthal’s failure to return the bailed dog presumptively established his negligence, shifting the burden of proving due care to Rosenthal. Having found Brousseau entitled to recover, the court noted that the general rules and principles measure damages by assessing the property’s market value. It then determined how to figure the value of the dog considering that Brousseau’s dog was a gift and a mixed breed and thus had no ascertainable market value.

ISSUES: How should the court make the plaintiff whole in dollars for Rosenthal’s negligence in causing the death of Brousseau’s dog, considering the fact that the dog was a gift and a mixed breed and thus had no ascertainable market value?

HOLDINGS:

1) Although the general rules and principles measure damages by assessing the property’s market value, the fact that Brousseau’s dog was a gift and a mixed breed and thus had no ascertainable market value need not limit the plaintiff’s recovery to a merely nominal award.

2) Neither the element of uncertainty in the assessment of damages for loss of her dog, nor the fact that damages cannot be calculated with absolute mathematical accuracy is a bar to plaintiff’s recovery.

3) As loss of companionship is a long recognized element of damages in New York, the court must consider such loss of companionship as an element of the dog’s actual value to Brousseau.

4) It would be wrong not to acknowledge the companionship and protection that Brousseau lost with the death of her canine companion of 8 years while ascertaining the value of the dog.

5) The dog’s age is not a depreciation factor in the court’s calculations, for manifestly, a good dog’s value increases rather than falls with age and training.